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THE ONE AND THE MANY 
Wi th Special Attention to the Doctrine of Participa.'ion 
in the Philosophy of Proclus 
CHAPTER I 
IN'TRODUCTIQ& 
One need make no apology for writing a graduate 
thesis on the system of Proclus. He w~s one of the greatest 
of the Neo-Platonists as well as the last of the great Greek 
thinkers. 
Proclus was not only a great commentator on the 
doctrine of Plato, but displayed great originality and also 
fil~ed in many gaps in the philosophy of his most illustrious 
predecessor Plotinus. He is considered the greatest systema-
tizer between Aristotle and Thomas Acquinas. 
There,is urgent need in our day for a revival of 
the discursive and dialectic method, for acute logical 
reasoning, and for a reinstatement of metaphysics to its proper 
place in the pantheon of modern philosophy. Whittaker very 
wisely says, 
"If too much method is at last fatal to progress, 
too little means intellectual anarchy --- for 
the modern anarchy of endless specialism is an 
anarchy without liberty. It means Ghat in-
dustrialism has led science captive. A renewed 
sense of wholeness is atlthe same time a re-
newed sense of freedom." 
. 
The modern craze for specialization, which never 
deals with more than the parts, has been a disappointment in 
the field of philosophy. It will be refreshing to deal with 
Proclus from the sheer fact that he at least endeavors to 
.' present an all comprehensive and systematic explanation of the 
universe. 
The plan of this dissertation will be to set forth 
with enough detail the method of the.p&ocedure of Plotinus and 
Proclus, (the method of each being substantially the same) by 
which they came to their interpretation of the cosmos. It will 
,. 
be necessary to do this first because the entire superstructure 
of the system of Proclus depends on it. 
Next a general sketch of the system will be presented 
in sufficient detail to clarify his general schematization. 
This may seem but a repetition of what is already well known, 
and may be found in many books, but Proclus has made enough im-
portant innovations into the philosophy of Plotinus to warrant 
a statement of his system, and the new elements or distinctive 
features of his system will be emphasized. 
The third and perhaps the most important part of the 
whole thesis, will be an attempt to trace the relation of the 
One and the Many with an especial effort to determine what 
Proclus means by his doctrine of participation. Participation 
is a much uS'ed term and still remains somewhat vague and il-
. 
lusive. It was not at all clear in the philosophy of Plato. 
If some contribution can be made toward a clearer understanding 
of this doctrine and determining of its meaning, the author 
will feel amply repaid for his efforts. 
As a last section. a summary of the salient points 
and an evaluation of the contribution of Proclus will be made. 
The outline in general is: 
.' 
I. Introduction 
II. The Method 
III. Sketch of His System 
IV. The Doctrine of ParticipatiQri~ 
V. Summary and Evaluation. 
Of the works used and referr~ to in this thesis the 
most important of the primary sources are: 
The Elements of Theology - translated by Dodds. 
Three Short Treatises on Providence, Fate and Evil -
translated by T. Taylor. 
Fragments of Lost Writings of Proclus - translated by 
T. Taylor. 
Proclus' Commentaries on the Alcibiades, the Timaeus, 
the Parmenides and the Republic. 
An English Translation by Taylor. (This edition is 
out of print and can only be had at the 
Newberry Library, therefore the references in 
this thesis will be to the Latin translation 
edited by Cousin, Paris 1804. 
The Enneads of Plotinus - translated by T. Taylor. 
The secondary sources are: 
The Comrnents of Dodds on The Elements of Theology. 
The Neo-PlatonIsts by Whittaker. 
The Philosophy of Plotinus by lnge. 
These are the more important ones. Others will appear in the 
bibliography. 
CHAPTER II 
THE METHOD 
The ·method of Proclus, as well as that of most of the 
Neo-Platonists, 1s psychological ~nd therefore based in sub-
jectivism. Since man is a microcosm~'~owledge of man and the 
world are necessarily correlated. Therefore a study of man is 
the first step to an interpretation of the universe. For 
Proclus the One or God can be apprehen!ed as the cause by the 
principle of mind itself. The Being of which the universe is a 
manifestation can only be understood by mind in its explicit 
activity.2 
In his process of introspection he found the soul to 
be not only unitary but also manifold; ana so he divides its 
activities into intuitive thought, reason or understanding, 
opinion and sense perception. To judge belongs to the soul as 
~ 
a unity and the common power of judgment is discursive reason. 
Again by introspection he contrasts the soul or thinking sub-
ject with thought. He also thinks of the universe in the same 
manner, that is, the One which animates through a series of 
causes must also be transcendent and thought of as in contrast 
to the universe. By its outgoing powers the soul animates the 
entire body but by introspective processes it remains always 
beyond the limits of the body. The soul has power to think 
and finds itself to be all things. On this point Whittaker 
says, 
"Since man is a microcosm, knowledge of man and of 
"the world are necessarily correlated. As God or 
the One can only be apprehended as the cause by 
the principle itself of the mind, so the Being of 
which the universe is a manifestation can only be .' 
understood by mind in its explicit activity. To 
place the theory of thinking beside the theory of 
the object of thought is declared to be a 
Pythagorean point of view. This meant what we 
now call an idealistic position. The remark has 
special relevance because the historigal Timaeus 
was said to have been a PythagQ;J'~.n 
It is thought by a great many writers that Plato sets 
out from a theory of knowledge which begins not by examining 
things but by asking what the mind ~an lnow. To learn the 
meaning of being and becoming, we must discover in what way 
each is known. The soul is not only unitary but it is also 
manifold, and there is a place for unity of thought, for reason 
or understanding, for opinion and for sense perception. For 
Proclus the power of judgment is discursive reason. At one ex-
treme the human mind may grasp by intellectual intuition and at 
the other it may comprehend by sense exp&rience. Since both of 
these philosophers are substantially the same in this psycho- ~ 
logical procedure, ~t will be much easier to sta~e the process 
from the EnneadS4 of Plotinus which deal with his psychology. 
The fact that he has an entire section on psychology and its 
relation to the cosmos, coupled with the above statements from 
Proclus, warrant the statement that the two are in this par-
• 
ticular in sUbstantial agreement. It will be much easier to 
give the psychological presentation of Plotinus inasmuch as he 
has much more clearly and specifically set it forth in his 
section on psychology, rather than cull here and there the 
statements of Proclus. 
He starts by insisting. on the paradoxical character 
of the soul's existence as contrasted with that of corporeal 
.' 
things. Body can be seen and touched and spread in space and 
time, while soul is invisible, intelligible, and by definition 
unextended. Soul cannot be described at all except by phrases 
which would be nonsensical if applie~~o body or its qualities, 
or to determinations of particular bodies. Body, once the soul 
is admitted and defined, can be described in terms of soul but 
• not so vice versa. With this broad statement he proceeds to 
find within tile soul all the metaphysical principles of the 
universe in some way represented. Among these principles are 
included that of unity, of pure intellect, of moving and vital-
izing power, and in some sense matter itself. 5 
The soul has not the characters of the thing pos-
sessing qua~ity. It is not subject to quantitative increase or 
decrease. The unity 1n perception would be impossible if that 
which perceives consisted of parts spatially separated. The 
best that could be attained, if the perceiving subJect consisted 
of spatially separated parts, would be a sort of transmitting 
of impressions from part to part. No such physical trans-
mission or succession of impressions could be because of the 
very nature of material man which consists of parts each 
standing by itself, one part having no knowledge of what is 
suffered in another. The feeling of pain is a good example of 
this. We must assume a percipient which is everywhere identica~ 
with itself. Such a perCipient must be another kind than body 
and that which thinks is still less body than that which 
perceives. Therefore, the thinking or rational soul is of ne-
cessity of different order of being than body. The soul can 
." 
and does apprehend things which have no magnitude and which do 
not require the use of bodily organs for their apprehension. 
Such are the abstract conceptions of the beautiful and the just 
That which is magnitude could not, tbe&efore, think that which 
is not magnitude. That which thinks must not be the body. The 
thinking subject cannot be body for the body nas no function as 
an extended whole (and to be such is its nature as body,) since 
it cannot as a whole come in contact with an object that is in-
6 
corporeal. According to Plotinus it is thus indivisible as 
he makes the statement "All in all and all and all in every 
part.,,7 This is also substantially the thought of Proclus. 
This is the soul's relation to body. Its unity is unlike that 
of the body which is one by spatial continuity, having differ-
ent parts each in a different place; and is also unlike that of 
. 
a quality of the body, such as color, which can be wholly in ,... 
many discontinuous bodies. The identity of soul is formal and 
not numerical. Pushing the quest for unity still further, the 
Neo-Platonist holds that above perception is reason which has 
no physical organ at all. A sort of judgment is allowed to 
perception. 
Both perception and memory are energies or activities 
not mere passive impressions received and stored up in the 
soul. In the perception of sight, for example, the thinking 
subject directs the vision to the object in order to perceive 
it more clearly. This outward direction would not be necessary 
if passive impressions were only rec'eived. The soul has power 
to read, as it were, these impressions and interpret them. Im-
.,' 
pressions are .one thing and the interpretations and judgmtmts 
of them are another. Memory of things is produced by the soul. 
If memory were simply the mere multitude of perceptions then 
there would not be any fading of memQrx. It would not be neces-
sary to consider or think in order to be reminded of anything 
if memory were only a.store of impressions. Neither could 
things be forgotten and recalled again~ The activity of per-
ception, though itsel~ mental, has di~ect physical conditions 
that memory has not. Memory itself is wholly of the soul though 
it may take its start from what may go on in the composite 
being. The soul directly preserves the memory of its own 
movements and not those of the body. The body furnishes no ex-
planation of the storing-up of mental impressions which are not 
magnitudes. It is often a hindrance to memory by its addition 
of impressions, as memory is based and emerges most clearly i~ 
abstraction and pure reasoning. Something of the distant past, 
which is latent, can best be recalled when the impressions of 
the moment are removed. Memory, as well as the reason, belong 
to the separable part of man, the soul. 
Again the soul can objectify its content and sepa-
. 
rate itself from thought. To this quest of consciousness and 
self-consciousness, Plotinus and Proclus have contributed 
greatly and cleared the matter to a considerable degree more 
than any of their Greek predecessors. They used the term 
(-p;;..pa../(l)j()iJ fii;y &LciT@ ), accompaniment of one's self, or 
; 
the synthesis or unitary activity of the soul in reference 
its contents. This is not, however, the highest «nity ac-
cording to these two philosophers. The highest mode of sub 
Jective life next. to complete unification, in which even 
thought disappears, is intellec~ual self-knowledge. In thi 
;;, .. 
the knower is identical with the known. This is beyond fee 
and feeling is a decided hindrance to it. One cannot objec 
one's self and still remain a se.f. That would be to separ 
the inseparable. Then as he drives his quest further he fi 
at the center of the mind a unity which is beyond even self 
knowledge. This is one with the metaphysical cause of all 
things and i~ the proof of its reality in the metaphysical. 
Upon this psychological unfolding of the microcos 
which.he finds in man, it is possible to proceed to a state 
ment of his in metaphysics. This statement, however, rever 
the order and starts with the One as ultimate unity. 
CHAPTER III 
A SKETCH OF THE SYSTEM 
Inasmuch as the philosophy of Proclus is a system, 
any approach to an understanding of ~t~must necessarily begin 
at the highest order of being or at the lowest. The approach 
of this tnesis will be the former. Probably one of the best 
·a statements of his scale of being and becoming is that of Dodds. 
(/ . 
"fOEV, which is uncaused, has maximal unity. 
TD v 6v, which is caused by7if. ~Y has unity and 
maximal being. ( ~wrl ' which is caused by7'd' EY andr.;'~", has 
unity, being and maximal life. 
Vo(Js, which is caused by~~" ,76' 'tY' , and",wI(, 
has unity, being, life and maximal 
I intelligence. ,~. t" 
t,Jv Xrt, which is caused by7D'H' / r;:. 6~ ~l.U'l ... , and 
VoV.s, has unity, being, life, intelli-
gence, and.discursive reason. ~~~, which are caused by~~v.J Tol."l)~ ~w1 and 
Va iJs , have unity, being, life , and 
minimal intelligence. (11/ ( <pvT~, which are caused by7D'tJl and TdOY) ~ ~1.N1 
have unity, being and minimal life. 
rt-Kp~ O"'U;f"-a..TD.. ~ k 'P u )'ov ), which 
are caused by ~~v and 10" ({y , have 
)/ uni ty and minimal being. 
uA~, which ia caused by70' ;y, has minimal 
unity." 
The One 
The highest order of being in the scale of Proclus is 
the One or the Pure Unity. This starting point is a logical 
one. Proclus stands among the many of the universe and makes 
a logical regress that there must be a One behind all multi-
plicity and that the multiplicity, which is apparent round 
about, in some way partiCipates of unity. The only 
transcendence that he ascribes to the One is that it is in no-
; 9 
wise infected with plurality. 
.,' ~ 
After the" same manner he approaches the question of 
cause and assumes that every cause must be superior to its 
product.10 In a logical regress he follows back and concludes 
that there 'necessarily must be a firs.j;· .... cause. ll This first 
cause he identifies with the Good and in turn states that all 
unification is a Good therefore the Good is identical with the 
one.
12 His scale of causation and identity of the One and the 
Good are arranged by Dodds as follows: 
"1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The cause is superior to the effect. (7) 
Unity and transcendence of the Good or 
Final Cause (8): it is distinct from the 
goodness both of dependent and of self-
sufficient principles. (9-10) 
Unity and transcendence of the Efficient 
Cause. (11) 
Identity of the Good with the EffiCient 
Cause. (12) . 13 
Identity of the Good with the One. (13)" 
The principle of the cause being superior to the 
effect is one of the underlying structures of all Neo-Platonism. 
If this principle is accepted, the modern doctrine of evolution, 
patterned on the Darwinian theory, would irrevocably be ruled 
out. According to Neo-Platonism any emergence of the higher 
from the lower must be attributed to the causative operation 
which already exists. Neo-Platonism would freely admit that 
such emergence is f0und in the phenomenal order,14 but would 
explain such emergence on the principle of the return of 
power to its source. The source of this power is eternal and 
unchangeably active in the real order of things. 
More shall be said on this matter later. It is well, however, 
to mention here that probably Plotinus was the first to apply 
Systematically the principle that the cause has always a higher 
and fuller reality than the effect. This doctrll~e is not ex-
clusively a Neo-Platonic doctrine but is also implicit in 
Plato's doctrine of Being and Becomi~4 It nas thus far been 
seen that the One is also the Primal Good and the Efficient 
Cause of all else. This, however, does not satisfy Proclus and 
he pushes his logical quest next into t~e realm of reality and 
endeavors to arran~e it in grades. His method here is the same 
as used centuries later by st. Thomas.* It is the doctrine of 
15 the Unmoved Muver. He uses the terms intrinsically or ex-
trinsically moved. He draws the perfectly logical conclusion 
that the self-moved must have the primacy over all movers. It 
is the Unmoved Mover. 
The next step in his consideration of reality is the 
power of reflecting upon one's self ana he concludes tnat ever~ 
original self-moving thing is capable of reversion upon it-
self. He also concludes that bodies cannot revert upon them-
selves and hence all things capable of reverting upon themselve~ I 
must be incorporeal. He says, 
"For it is not in the nature of any body to revert 
upon itself. That which reverts upon anything is 
conjoined with that upon which it reverts: Hence 
it is evident that every part or a body reverted 
upon itself must be conjoined with every other 
part - since self-reversion is precisely the case 
in which the reverted subject and that upon which 
* Note: That is the method of st. Thomas in reference to the 
one item viz: "The Unmoved Mover." 
"it has reverted become identical. But this is im-
possible for a body, and universally for any di- ~ 
visible substance: for the whole of a divisible 
substance cannot be conjoined with the whole of 
itself, because of the separation of its parts, 
which occupy different positions in space. It 
is not in the nature, then, of any body to revert 
upon itself so that the whole is reverted upon 
the whole. Thus if there is anything which is 
capable of reverting upon itsI~~ it is in-
corporeal and without parts." 
The gradation of reality, according to Proclus, as 
worked out by Dodds, is as follows; • 
n(a) 
(b) 
Vertical stratification of reality: 
1. There is an Unmoved and a Self-moved. (14) 
2. The Self-moved has reflexive conscious-
ness (17), and is therefore incorporeal 
(15) and independent of Body (16) 
3. There is nothing in the effect that is 
not primitively in the cause (18). 
Therefore Soul, being the source of self-
movement in bodies, is primitively self-
moved (20). . . 
4. The primitive character of any grade is 
permanent and universal (l~). Hence in-
telli~ence does not belong primitively to 
Soul·t20) . 
5. There are thus four grades, Body, soul, 
Intelligence, and the One. (20) 
General structure of reality in each stratum: 
1. As a One and Many. (21-2) 
2. As a triad of Unpar!~cipated, Participated, 
Participant. (23-4) 
According to the above the One is the highest of all 
reality and has the power of reversion upon itself. The 
doctrine has moved from a metaphysical abstraction and is 
identified with the Summum Bonum and is the ground of indi-
viduality in that all things work according to natural appetite 
toward the largest good. Each individual must reach an indi-
vidual good and fit into the pattern of the all-embracing Good. 
He further, in proposition 18, attributes to this One the power 
of reflexive conscience. He also states that this f'unetion is 
in nowise 'the function of a body. It is in keeping with his 
doctrine of Unity because in the operation of reflexive con-
science it is not a case of one part of the soul bein6 subject 
..... 
and the other part object but it is the sum unit functioning as 
both subject and object and therefore his unity of the One is 
preserved. This, it will be found, is.true of each stratum of 
the real. Each grade of reality, except the One alone, is an 
independent principle and enjoys unification though by partici-
pation. 
On the matter of procession and reversion Proclus is 
at once confronted with the problem of preserving the unity 
of the One and at the same time accounting for the existence 
of a universe outside the One. This, according to Dodds, calls 
forth four points under each division; that is, under pro-
cession and under reversion. His scheme of stating the problem 
of Proclus is: 
fI(a) Procession 
1. Law of' Emanation (25). 
2. Law of Undiminished Giving (26,27). 
3. Law of Continuity (28, 29). 
4. Law of Immanence (30). 
(b) Reversion 
1. Reversion retraces the movement of 
Procession (31-4,38). 
2. Triad of Immanence, Procession, 
Reversion (35). . 
3. Reversion is recovery of value lost in 
Procession (36, 37). 
4. Three grades of reversion (39).18 
He maintains that the laws of emanation do not di-
minish the resources of.the cause. At the present we are 
.' interested only in the relation oT the One to this process of 
procession and reversion. In a later chapter it will be ex-
amined more in detail since it is the heart and soul of the 
participation philosophy. The One i~\he Efficient Cause from 
whence the next highest order of reality proceeds. The 
movement does not start or occur within-the One since any 
• movement would destroy its unity, and if it be external to the 
One, it must be derive.d from the One ei·ther by another external 
movement (this would lead to an infinite regress) or wi tilout 
movement, which is the doctrine of Proclus. 
His next item in the Elements of Theology is the dis-
cussion of the self-constituted. The self-constituted is 
identified with the One and the Good, not as something equal to 
them but as the same thing. The self-constituted cannot depend 
- ..... 
upon anything prior to it or any other cause which is superior 
to it for its existence or its activity. The self-constituted 
is capable of reversion upon itself and is without temporal 
origin. It is also imperishable and wit!lout parts, or simple. 
It is perpetual and transcends the things that are measured by 
time with respect to their existence. It is of an eternal sub-
, 
stance. 
At least Proclus in his discussion of the henads or 
gods, gives the name of God to the One or the Good. 19 He 
uses the word gods in the plural and places the gods in the 
highest of orders or series but makes of the One or the Good a 
sort of Godhead. When the question of participation is dis-
cussed in further detail, other reference to this matter will bE 
.' 
made. This plurality of henads seems to be brought in by 
Proclus not only to maintain the One as such, but also to ac-
count for the ones which are found in reality. FUrther, he 
says that all which proceeds from any.~inciple must remain in 
the producing cause and proceeds from it. T~is lays the ground 
work for his doctrine of reversion. By connecting ooth cause 
• and effect with this common link, he does not allow them to 
become entirely separated and thus they never are absolutely 
distinct things; else the effect might become an altogether new 
thing. In his own words he says, 
"Every productive principle will imitate the One, 
the productive cause of the sum of tnings: for 
the non-primal is everywhere derived from the 
primal, so that a principle productive of certain 
things must derive from the principle which pro-
duces all things. Therefore, every productive 
principle produces it~oconsequents while itself 
remaining steadfast. n 
Proclus' doctrine of reversion is summed up in this 
statement: 
n~yery effect that remains in ~!s cause proceeds 
from it and reverts upon it." 
He accounts for the union of things with things and reality 
with reality by this philosophy of procession and reversion. 
He deduces his doctrine of reversion from the fact that each 
thing has a natural· appetition of its well being and of the 
Good and has an upward -tension toward its begetter. In his 
attempt to account for the One and the Many in the highest 
realm of reality, Professor Taylor holds that Proclus was 
teaching a doctrine of the attributes of God something like the 
doctrine of Philo and the later scholastics, but this, as Dodds 
.' points out, is very, very doubtful. 22 
Intelligence 
Here again the system of triads, which pervades his 
...... 
whole system, is brought forth; namely, the unparticipated and 
the participated and the partaker. He holds that there is a 
hierarchy of intelligences and in his ~ statement says: 
"There is both unparticipated and participated in-
telligence; and the latter is participated either 
by supra-mundane or by intra-mundane souls. 
"For the whole number of intelligences the un-
participated is sovereign, having primal existence 
(Propositions 23, 24). And of the participated 
intelligences some irradiate the supra-mundane 
and unparticipated soul, others the intra-mundane. 
For the intra-mundane class cannot proceed without 
mediation from the unparticipated Intelligence, 
since all procession is through like terms 
(Proposition 29), and a class which is independent 
of the world-order bears more likeness to the un-
participated than one which is locally distributed. 
Nor, again, is the supra-mundane class the only 
one: but there must be intra-mundane intelligences, 
first, because there are intra-mundane gods 
(Proposition 165); secondly, because the world-
order itself is possessed of intelligence as well 
as of soul; t.i:lird, because intra-mundane souls must 
participate supra-mundane intelligences through 
the mediation of intelli~ences which are intra-
mundane (Proposition 109),,23 
After a long and intricate dialectic process, Proclus 
concludes that the entire intellectual series is finite. He 
proves this on the basis of logical unity. Intelligences are 
finite in two aspects: 
(a) In that their number is limited and there-
fore not infinite. 
(b) Intelligences are below the One and there-
fore not infinite in the order of being. 
..' The Primal Intelligence is divine and unparticipated. In his 
discussion of the order of Intelligence he says that every in-
telligence is a whole though not in the sense of one composite 
of parts while every unparticipated ~~lligence is a whole 
without qualification and has its parts implicit in its totali~ 
On the oth:.::r hand, each specific intelligence contains the wholE 
as a whole in the parts. • In this one aspect it is all things 
specifically and there remains a constant that runs through all 
intelligences. This constant is t.tle cause, wh:L.ch in this case 
is the higher order of intelligence, and the cause remains in 
the effects and thus runs as a stream, as it were, or forms a 
constant which links the successive orders together. The 
higher and more universal the cause the farther does the con-
stant reach in power but not in extension of production nu-
merically. He ends by saying that every participated divine 
intelligence is participated by divine souls and that partici-
pation assimilates the participant to the participatedprinci-
pIe and causes it to have the same nature and thus the soul is 
annexed to a divine intelligence. To quote his own words, 
which are very clear, he says, 
"Every participated divine intelligence is partici-
pated by divine souls. 
"For if participation assimilates the participant 
t'o the participated prinCiple and causes it to 
have the same nature, it is plain that a soul 
which participates and is annexed to a divine in-
telligence is itself divine, participating through 
r-~-------------------. 
"the mediation of the intelligence the divinity 
immanent therein. For that divinity is co-
operative in linking the participant soul to 
the intelligence and thus bindin~4the divine 
to the divine. (Proposition 56). 
.' 
Intelligence 'stands midway between the One and the 
next lower order of being. To the One by participation and to 
. 9'" the lower order because it is the consequent to which intelli-
gence is the cause. Proclus makes it, then, to be identical, 
after a manner, with both its priors a~ its consequents. The 
superior Intelligence, or the Unparticipated Intelligence, 
knows all things unconditionally; while subsequent intelligence 
knows all in one special aspect. They are capable of self-
reversion and know themselves, while the unparticipated knows 
itself only, but since it contains the whole within itself it 
knows all things. He makes the Primal Intelligence, as well 
as all other intelligences, to be eternal. They seem secondary 
to the One only in order of being and not in priority of time • 
..... 
Probably his system of procession and reversion compels him 
to make them eternal since he makes all proceed from the One 
and return tu it. If the On'e is eternal and all lower orders 
proceed from it, and if, as Proclus maintains, tne cause remain:: 
in the, effect and reaches as deep as the effect may go, then 
all proceeds from the One and must be eternal. It is a logical 
deduction. Proclus is famous for his logical method and is so 
insistent upon it that the eternity of intelligence is logi-
cally necessary to his system. 
soul and Matter 
.. ' 
"Soul", as Proclus says, "is the living world." It 
is not thought as opposed to thing; it is its own world, as 
Spirit is its own world. It is just witnin the confines of 
real existence (ousia); but it is mo~'~oosely integrated tnan 
the world of Spirit, and therefore the particular forms which 
compose it are not, when taken apart, what they seem to be. 
( . The world of the soul the kosmos zotikos) is real but it can 
25 
not be pulled to pieces without admixture of error. That is, 
singulars cannot be taken out of the pattern of the whole 
because in so considering single things they would lack some 
of their relationships with the whole and therefore this lack 
of knowledge of such relationships would constitute error. 
Proclus distinctly says that Matter is not evil but 
, "a creation of God" (yl Y'v~ p..~ at-ou) necessary to the existence 
of the world. This thought is not well developed in Plotinus 
and he did shrink from endowing his own "Matter" with active 
powers of resistance. Moreover, he never regarded reality 
(ousia) as the result of conflicting elements in the Absolute, 
nor would he have admitted that without tension there can be 
no life "Yonder". But he does say in one place "the All is 
, 
made up of contraries".26 Proclus would deny that there are 
any active powers or powers at all given to Matter. Evil, 
therefore, could not be a resistance on the part of Matter 
because Matter is perfectly passive. 
gree very decidedly with Plotinus. 
In this he would disa-
,.... 
r 
Absolute. 
Lower kinds of Matter are created immediately by the 
Proclus says that the One acts directly upon Matter. 
.' 
His doctrine is that the higher the principle, the further down 
27 does its power extend. 
Proclus makes necessity and will with God identical. 
"Proclus is more emphatic in rej~~ng dual-
istic interpretation of the nature of Matter. 
Matter, he says, cannot struggle against the 
Good, since it cannot act in any way. It is 
not disordered movement; for movement implies 
force, and Matter .has none. It is. not the evil 
one, since it is an essential part of the compo-
sition of the world, and is derived from the 
One. It is not 'necessity' though it is neces-
sary. What then is it? Take away order from 
everything that is orderly, and what remains 
is Matter. It is that which, if it had any 
active power, which it has not, would produce 
disintegration in that which is integrated, 
disconnection in that which is connected. It 
is in a word that which is no thing, though 
no absolutely nothing; it is a 'true lie l .,,28 
Necessity in the system of Proclus Simply means that 
if Matter had not been created the impartation of the Good to 
creatures could not have been accomplished. Matter was neces- ~ 
sary else all would have remained hidden in the ineffable One. 
It is necessary to generation. 
According to the above Proclus attributes the origin 
of Matter directly to the One. When he says the world of 
. 
Matter is derived from the One, it would seem that he bases it 
~n the logic which reigns between cause and effect. Every 
cause transcends its resultant. It would seem that the actual 
is the perfect for him, and the potential is imperfect and that 
any particular thing passes into actuality through the agency 
of that in which its potentiality is already actual. Tracing 
thiS back one must,~of course, find pure actuality. This is 
found only in the One. Then logically the One produces all 
.' things through the principle of becoming actual. In proposi-
tion 27 he says, 
"Every producing cause is productive of secondary 
existences because of its completeness and super-
flu! ty of potency. ;;, .., 
"For if it had produced not because of its com-
pleteness, but by reason of a defect of potency, 
it could not have maintained unmoved its own 
station: since that which throug~ defect or 
weakness bestows existence unon another furnishes 
the substance of that other by a conversion and 
alteration of its own nature. But every pro-
ducer remains as it is, and its consequent pro-
ceeds from it without change in its steadfast-
ness. (Proposition 26). Full and complete, then, 
it brings to existence the secondary principles 
without movement and without loss, itself being 
what it is, neither transmuted into the second-
aries nor suffering any diminution. For the 
product is not a parcelling-out of the producer: 
that is not a character even of physical genera-
tion or generative causes. Nor is it a trans-
formation: the producer is not the matter of 
what proceeds from it, for it remains as it is, 
and its product is a fresh existence beside it. 
Thus the engenderer is established beyond altera-
tion or diminution, multiplying itself in virtue 
of its generative potency and furnishing from 
itself secondary substances~29 
In support of the statement that his system is based 
more on logic than in the investigation of nature with regard 
to the origin of Matter, attention is drawn to Proposition 26, 
which reads as follows: 
"Every productive cause produces the. next and 
all subseque~t principles while itself remaining 
steadfast." 0 
He would, of course, hold that there may be many intermediate 
steps between the One and the world of Matter. One is at a 
r ~loSS to understand how Matter can ever revert back to the One 
in any other manner but logically. Proclus holds that every 
.' 
effect remains in its cause and proceeds from it and reverts 
upon it. Matter is certainly an effect with the One as its 
ultimate cause. Although there are secondary causes in the 
procession, Matter must revert back a,t'..J.east to soul. Proclus, 
however, does not explain how this actuallY takes place and 
deals with it on a basis of pure logic only. He says that body 
has no participation in soul and it WOu\d seem that a definite 
break in the order of reversion would of necessity take place. 
His own words are: 
"From this it is apparent why Matter, taking its 
origin from the One, is in itself devoid of 
Form; and why body, even though it participates 
Being, is in itself without participation in 
soul. For Matter, which is the basis of all 
things, proceeded from the cause of all things; 
and body, which is the basis of ensouled ex-
istence, is derived from a principle more uni-
versal than soul, in31hat after its fashion it 
participates Being." 
In man's reversion back to the One he does not ex-
plain how he makes the transition from one level of reality 
or being to the other but seems to teach that in special cases 
man, while yet in the body, can have ecstatic experiences with 
the One. In the scheme of Plotinus, which is not so clear in 
Proclus, Matter is used in many ways. Ell but nonexistent' 
Matter, which is at the bottom of the scale, is redeemed in 
giving itself as the recipient of form. In so doing it is an 
image of the great surrender whereby the World-soul receives 
illumination from Spirit and the ineffable self-surrender by 
which Spirit itselr awaits the visitation or the absolute 
Godhead. Matter, according to Proclus, is the resultan~'or the 
direct act or the One but yet it is never to be redeemed becausE 
it has no self-surrender power. It was necessary to create 
Matter in order that the will-activities or the Soul might 
become actualities. Matter, however,·~ not in opposition to 
the Good because it has no power or its own. 
Proclus rurther says that God created the world by 
• His will, His goodness and His providence, a trinity in unity 
of motives. These correspond to the three attributes which he 
ascribes to Spirit-Being, Power, Activity. The soul descends 
into the phenomenal world because it desires to imitate the 
32 providence or the gods. He would hold that the higher does 
not need the lower; that is, God does not need the universe, 
but God would have remained hidden without the universe. There-
rore, the universe is necessary in order that the Good might 
be revealed and in the process of procession and reversion the 
lower can imitate the higher and finally arrive at its proper 
source or end in reverting back to the higher. The soul, when 
it is separated rrom the body, has the Pneuma (shadow) as its 
vehicle. The vehicle, or Pneuma, has been received by the soul 
rrom the Celestial sphere. It is a sort of astral or gaseous 
body which the soul wears when it leaves its earthly body. He 
almost makes it to be a corporeal thing although its substance 
is or extreme tenuity. It is an invisible, intangible body, 
the first incorporation or the soul. Apart from this unirying 
principle nothing could exist. 
All would be formless and indeterminate and therefore 
would have no being properly considered. The principle ~f unity 
in the soul is of higher order than that in natural things. A 
body has less unity because its parts are locally separate. 
Even the unity in the soul is not the highest unity because 
there are many individual souls. Par~~ular souls, because of 
what they have in common, are derived from a general soul. This 
general soul is their cause but it is not identical with all 
of them. In turn, this general soul fails short of complete 
unity because it is the principle of life and motion in a world 
which is other than itself. The individual souls have intel-
lect and this points to a higher unifying principle. This 
unifying principle is stable intellect that is, ,itself able to 
think itself, and not the world, and this super-intellect con-
tains, as identical with its own nature, the eternal ideas of 
all forms, both general and particular. Tnese forms oecome ex-
plicit in the things of space and time, but even this intellec~ 
so highly unifying has still a certain duality because although 
the intelligence and the intelligible are the same in self-
knowledge, that which this intelligence can do and does, dis-
tinguishes itself from the object of thought. Above this is 
Absolute Unity, the One which is simply identical with itself • 
• 
This is other than All-being but is the cause of All-being. It 
is the highest good to which all things aspire. The greatest 
good for particular things is the greatest unification. Their 
aspiration for goodness and unity beyond that which they possess 
cannot be explained without positing the Absolute One and the 
Absolute Good as their source and end. Proclus later identi-
fies the One and the Good., In regard to this particular pOint, 
.' Proclus goes beyond Aristotle, who held that the One could 
think itself. To Proclus, the attribute of thinking itself 
belonged to mind only and not to the One. 
Proclus, with Plotinus, alIQ~ a genuine reality to 
all grades of being and this extends even to Matter. He does 
not hold that virtue and knowledge here are simply images of 
• archetypes yonder in the intelligible world but that everything 
which is here is there. Plotinus is very clear in his state-
ment of this and Proclus follows very definitely the same 
doctrine; namely, that first, second and third orders in the 
33 intelligible principles are not spatial. In the intelligible 
order body may be said to be in the soul and soul in the One. 34 
By such expressions a relation of dependence rather than a 
being in a place in the sense of locality is to be understood. 
Every multitude must participate in some manner in 
the One. If a multitude had no unity at all, it would consist 
either just of parts which are not beings or parts which are 
themselves multitudes, and so on to infinity. Every multitude, 
according to Proclus, is at the same time one and not one but 
derives its existence from the One in itself. Logically, that 
, 
which is produced cannot be greater than the producer. Later, 
it will be seen that the One as cause penetrates all things 
even to the lowest order by remaining in the effect. He main-
tains that the higher in the causal order, the lower down is 
the reach of that cause. Thus the One being at the highest has 
the farthest reach and remains even to the lowest forms. After 
identifying the Good with the One he goes on to show thdt the 
First Good is that for which all beipgs strive. It must, there-
fore, be before all beings. Nothing can be added to it else it 
would be lessened by such addition SO ~t stands as the simple 
... 
and First Good. If there is to be adequate and trustworthy 
knowledge, there must be an order of causation and this neces-
sitates a first in this order. Causes .ould not go in a circle 
because that would make the same thi~gs to be prior and poster-
ior, better and worse. There can be no infinite series because 
to make logical knowledge pOSSible, or at least to have logical 
order, which to Proclus is absolutely essential to real know-
ledge, there mus~ be a final term. 35 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DOCTRINE CIt' PARTICIPi.TION 
A General Sketch. 
Wbile words cannot be naile~'~ight to any meaning ex-
clusive of all others, yet most philosophic writers have been 
very careful to give words a certain connotation and then use 
them according to that meaning. As the \urden of this thesis is 
to rest upon the doctrine of participation, it might not be a 
complete loss to attempt to define the word participation and at 
least establish and clarify its meaning according to its use in 
/ 
the writings of Proclus. The word in the Greek is ~~Tc X.W ) . 
This is the first person present indicative of the verb. The 
noun simply means a participating one. Taking the verb apart it 
)1 
is a combination of r.rvE/~) and (c,(t,..J). (jA-('-lZ)used in compo-
sition has the following meanings according to Liddell and Scott, 
1. of community or participation; 2. of community of a.ction in 
common with others. With the genitive it means to be in the 
midst of objects or in the midst of, among, or between. Sophocles' 
used it in Ph. 1312. <r-i:~ ~~vTW)I {"IVa.,) to be with or among 
the living ones or to belong to that tribe or group. To sh~re 
a common life with them. Also used in Aeschylus Ag. 1037. 
C71bX(;.Jy r-l-Ta:. JaV'", Wy ) means among ehe slaves of the cities 
which signifies a sharer of the life of the slaves. 
Another meaning of the geni ti ve is in cornmon with, in 
connection with, along with, by aid of. These uses imply closer 
~ 
union than the Greek word (ffU v). In the Iliad 13:700 
) t' 
(fA-6T4." r301 w~v €rc-~DvTo) means by the aid of, in a ~.ombat, 
or fighting among the ranks. 
~fr-~) with the accusative it means: A. of motion, 
right into the middle of, coming into or among, especially where 
a number of persons are implied (as iBt& a tribe) 
II. 15,54. B. In pursuit of or quest of, to pursue one 
or go in search uf. C. Mere sequence or succession. Next 
• after, behind. D. In order of time next after. E. In order 
of worth or rank, or according to. 
I' 
The word (J.-~\(l.) has many other meanings but since 
they do not have any particular bearing on our subject the above 
will be sufficient. 
}) 
The other word in this combination is (~~~) which 
means: 
"Active Voice - Radic. signf., to have, hold. 
I. to have in the hands, in Hom. very freq. 
to receive in the hands:- hence in various usages. 
1. to have, hold, possess: of outwara. goods, 
propert~,)~tc., the most common usage, Hom.: 
later (~ f: ¥orT€-5. ), a, wealthy or fo],:erful man, 
Soph. AJ • .1~7, Valck, Pnoen. 408; 0 €Xov~S , 
the weal thy, Eur. Aic. 57. 36 
Passive voice - to be possessed by, belong to." 
Now putting both of these words together, the compound 
as rendered according to the Lexicon of Liddell & Scott wou~d be 
as follows: First the verb form, 
-" 
"t--t-ltXw) to share in, partake of, enjoy a 
share, take part in. Construct, usu. c. gen. 
rei only. To be a member of a tribe, to share 
same blood. In Plato, to partake in con-
stituent ideas.,,37 
Second, the noun form, 
/ 
nCt--,"TD)<..OS) sharing in, partaking of, c. gen. 
Eur. Ion 697, Plat. Phaedr. 262 D. etc.; a part-
ner, accomplice in. (70~ ¢>o"'YOY ) with dative of 
persons, to share or enjoy a friendship; partakers 
in common, in acc. case. noB 
.' 
One further source of information conc8rning the 
meaning of this term is the New Testam~t. The noun form of 
the very word is used in the plural in Hebrews 6:4, where it is 
rendered 'partakers' or ~articipaters' of the Holy Ghost. In 
• the Latin Vulgate the word is rendered 'participes' and this 
means, according to The Universal Latin Lexicon39, partakers of, 
having a share in, to be a companion, a fellow, or an associate. 
The verb form in Latin means to cause to share. This statement 
is important inasmuch as one of the main problems in both 
Platonism and Neo-Platonism is whether this act of participa-
tion is a cause or an effect. If the participation originates 
in the thing itself, then it would of necessity have to be co-
eternal with the thing which it participates, if tnat thing be 
-an eternal thing. If it is an effect, then the power of giving 
to the lesser reality a share of the greater must be vested in 
the greater. It will be seen that Proclus makes an endeavor to 
settle this point. In The Elements of Theolog~ Proclus uses 
over and over again this very Metexo in the transitive sens~. 
As a transitive verb it would mean that the lesser reality 
does the action of participating in the higher reality, but it 
would be too much to demand this meaning from his construction 
because his entire system seems to make the participation on 
the part of the lesser reality a sort of effect rather than a 
cause. It is at least logically an effect. One can be genu-
.' inely certain that the meaning of the word is to have in common, 
to some degree, something which the higher reality is or pos-
sesses. A more detailed investigation of his system ~ill es-
tablish this point. 
The major problem in all Platonism, and especially 
in Proclus, is how the One can produce the many, or in other 
words, how one thing can participate in·another. Proclus is 
great for triads. The unparticipated, the participated and the 
participating or participant, is the triad that he uses in this 
doctrine. One must be ever reminded that his system is a meta-
physical system based on logical order. Space and time, in the 
sense of chronolo6ical order, do not enter into his explanations 
of the universe. First in order is always that which cannot be 
participated in, or the unparticipated. This is tne One before 
all, always distinguished from the One in all. This in turn 
generates the things that are participated in. Next, and in-
ferior to these are the things that participate. They are in-
ferior to those that are participated like the middle one is to 
the first. On the reach of the One down through all beings and 
as the cause remaining in the effect, vVhittaker says, 
"The perfect in its kind, since in so far as it is 
perfect it imitates the cause of all, proceeds to 
the production of as many things as it can; as 
the Good causes the existence of everything. The 
more or the less perfect anything is, of the more 
or the fewer things is it the cause, as being 
nearer to or more remote from the cause of all. 
That which is furthest from the principle is un-
productive and the cause of nothing. 
ttThe productive cause of other things remains in 
itself while producing. That which produces is 
productive of the things that are second to it, 
by the perfection and superabundance of its 
power. For if it gave being to other things 
through defect and weakness, they would receive 
their existence through its alteration; but it 
remains as it is. 
"Every productive cause brings i.Qt~ existence things 
like itself before things unlike. EQuals it 
cannot produce, since it is necessarily better 
than its effects. The progression from the 
cause to its effects is accomplished by re-
semblance of the things that are ~econd in order 
to those that are first. Being s1milar to that 
which produces it, the immediate product is in 
a manner at once the same with and other t.ilan 
its cause. It remains therefore and goes forth 
at the same time, and neither element of the 
process is apart from the other. Every product 
turns back and tries to reach its cause; for 
everything strives after the Good, which is the 
source of its being; and the mode of attaining 
the Good for e~ch thing is through its own 
proximate cause. The return is accomplished by 
the resemblance the things that return bear to 
that which they return to; for the aim of the 
return is union, and it is always resemblance 
that unites. The progression and the return 
form a circular activity. There are lesser and 
greater circles according as the re~urn is to 
things imrnediately above or to those that are 
higher. In the great circle to and from the 
principle of all, all things are involved. rt40 
.' 
That which is nearer to the One is less in quantity 
than the more distant but greater in potency.41 The more uni-
v,coral always precedes in this causal action and the more par- I 
ticular continues after it. In the order of generalities 2n 
the causal order being comes before living-being and living-
being before man. Life is below the rational power but where 
there is no life there is still being. Matter is the extreme 
bound and it has subsistence only from the most universal cause, 
namely, the One. Tbe One is the subject of all things and there 
fore'Matter proceeds from the cause of all. Even body, which is 
.' 
below the sOQ4participates of existence but not from the soul 
as it has its subsistence from the One which is more universal 
than soul. The more plurality or divisibility there remains in 
any genus, the farther it is from the.Oae. Lik~wise it is the 
weakest. The finite is a sort of limited power. In the dis-
cussion of the infinite Proclus holds that that which is infinite 
• is infinite neither to the things above it, nor to itself, but 
to the things that are inferior. It always retainS a transcend-
ence to the inferior. It has something that exists from the un-
folding of its powers but is defined and held as a whole by it-
self and to that which is above it. That which is above always 
retains as cause an element imparticible or transcendent and re-
tains by itself a certain detachraent from each succeeding stage. 
Proclus introduces intermediate terms to bridge the gaps from 
one order to a lower. This is one distinct characteristic of 
his system. 
It should be said that this section of our discussion 
is based principally on The Elements of TheoloKl because this 
work is exclusively that of Pr9clus, and at the same time it is 
his most complete statement and systematic explanation of t~e 
universe. The references will be made to the propositions in-
stead of page numberings. 
In every order of being Proclus maintains his triad of 
the unparticipated, the participated and the participating one. 
Vfuen he speaks of orde~ consideration is not to be given to 
numerical or chronological order, but logical order. It is an 
order of dependence and interdependence rather thap of f~rst, 
second or last. The One from which all things der·i ve their ex-
istence is first logically, and by virtue of being first in' 
logical unity it has the farthest reach or is first in reach of 
productivity and power. The cause reMat.ns farthest in the effect 
by being first in order of Qeing and therefore more universal and 
effective. All things having being owe that being to the One 
• ultimately. Again the One is the Undiminished Giver by virtue 
~ 
of being first, and not only possessing unity, out by being unity 
in see In the material realm it might be debatable as to whether 
a cause can remain an undiminished giver but it would seem that 
Proclus can bear his case very well in the logical realm and in 
the realm of spiritual or simple essences. That is the realm in 
which he starts, continues, and concludes his philosophy. There 
are, however, two illustrations in human work-a-day things that 
bolster his position. First, in the realm of knowledge, the 
more one teaches or imparts to another does not decrease or 
diminish the original supply of knowledge of t.ne teacher. If 
anything, teaching is a means of increase. But, of course, for 
Proclus the Primal Intellect is perfect in knowledge and not sub-
ject to increase. Second, in the realm of holiness of lif,e, or 
goodness, the more good things or acts one might do does not 
diminish the intrinsic goodness of that inaividual, and so the 
logical position of Proclus is, at least to this degree, de-
monstrable in the realm of direct observation. 
The very debatable question about conservation of 
of energy; that is, whether the sum total of energy in the 
universe suffers any increase or decrease, would at least not 
.' 
militate against the position of our philosopher. 
The great difficulty as one attacks the ']jroblem of 
participation, is that there are few terms in the human language 
which are adequate to describe tne aa.t'J,vities of simple essences 
and spiritual functions. There are found, however, many mental 
and moral activities, such as mentioned above, which give suf-
• ficient lead to require only deductions that are well within the 
bounds of reason to complete the transitions to the general par-
ticipation scheme which undergirds the whole system of Proclus. 
1Nhen he says that every multitude participates unity, it is the 
question of the whole being in the part as well as the part 
being in the whole. In dealing with simple SUbstances or terms 
such as unity, being, and cause, one carulot divide them. The 
whole scheme of these things lies outside the realm of extension 
or quantity, just as goodness and knowledge do. In 11is dis-
cussion of cause the whole possibility of knowledge rests in the 
fact of a final term. 42 He maintains that it would make no 
difference how many intermediate causes there might be as this 
would in nowise weaken the Efficient and First Cause but rather 
holds that the First Cause is superior to all its product. 
There must be a First Cause else all the causal chain would run 
in a circuit and tllen cause and effect would both be prior and 
consequent at once. 43 Proclus not only holds that the cause 
must be equal to the effect but very baldly states that it of 
necessity must be superior. Of course he means in efficiency 
there can be only one First Cause and this First Cause is the 
One. Since unity must be the subsistence of all manifold, the 
.' 
manifold is necessarily posterior to the One,44 the Good being 
identified with the One as the principium. The First Cause of 
all transmits its causal relation into all the effects wnich 
follow and therefore imparts to them :tQ.is element of good, which 
in turn, is the appetite within all the effects that causes them 
to strive to return again to the Good. A kind. of indissoluble 
• link or undergirding binds t11e universe together. It serves as 
a sort of desire and this desire is the reversive power which 
turns the attention of all things back to the Good. 45 
In Proclus' scheme of participation he seems to have 
an abhorance for any wide gaps and in order to fill in these 
gaps between the several great and sharp divisions of reality, 
he propounds the doctrine of the Demiurge,.to fill the gap be-
tween the One and the Intelligence. In the system of Proclus 
the Demiurge simply means that the One has delegated to the 
henads the power of origination. That is, these henads have a 
certain power of producing or of generation, and thus there are 
many pOints of origination. The One is not the direct world-
maker but it gives to these sub-divinities a sort of creative 
power and thus fills the gap. After the One he has a sect~on on 
henads or gods. The whole number of these gods have the charac-
ter of unity. They are likewise self-complete but all remain in 
ferior to the One. They are all above life, being and intelli-
gence.46 This doctrine of henads if probably a consequent de-
velopment from Plotinus. 
Proclus seeks the cause of plurality in things that 
are of a higher stage than the intelligible world; Plot~us 
was content to stop there. Whittaker helps us at this point. 
He says, 
"Much has been written upon the question, wha.t the 
henads of Proclus really mean---Now so far as the 
origin of the doctrine is conceT~d, it seems to 
be a perfectly consequent development from 
Plotinus. Proclus seeks the cause of plurality 
in things at a higher stage tnan the intelligible 
world, in which Plotinus had been content to find 
its beginning. Before being and .ind are pro-
duced, the One acts as it were through many 
pOints of origin; from each of these start many 
minds; each of which again is the principle of 
further differences. As the primal unity is ca~~ed 
(Theos), the derivative unities are in corl'es;)ond-
ence called (gods). Thus the doctrine is pure 
deductive metaphysics_ n47 
Even at tne r~sk of another long quotation it would 
seem necessary to quote the very important Proposition 116, in 
which Proclus offers proof for his doctrine of participation. 
The same question is involved in each step from one order of 
being to a lower one. If one step can be set forth, it will 
serve for an explanation of all the others. 
"That with the other henads we reach the partici-
pable, we shall prove as follows: If after the 
First Principle tnere be another imparticipable 
henad, how will it differ from the One? Ii' it 
be one in the same degree as the lat~er, why 
should we call it secondary and the One primal? 
And if in a different degree, then relatively 
to simple Unity it will be one and not-one. If 
that element of 'not-one' be nQthing substantive, 
the henad will be pure unity (and identical with 
the One); but if it be a substantive character 
other than unity, then the unity in the henad 
will be participated by the non-unity. What is 
self-complete will then be this unity whereby 
it is linked to the One itself, so that once 
more the god, qua god, will be this component 
(prop_ 114), while that which came into 
"existence as not-one exists as one by partici-
pation in the unity. Therefore every henad 
posterior to the One is participable; and every ~. 
god is thus participable. n48 
The order of tne divine henads is graduated. Some are 
more universal while others are more par'ticular; the more par-
ticular being generated fromtne more,up.iversal but not by 
... ..,. 
division, nor by alteration, nor even through the manifold re-
lationships, but by the production of secondary progressions 
through superabundance of power. 49 The.gods transcend all di-
vision, all alteration and all relation and are only d.iffer-
entiated one from another in an o~der of power. 50 
These henads, or at least the primal henad, communi-
cate their power to mind, and through mind it is presented to 
soul and then the soul actuates the body and even the body, in 
a sense, participates in the henad and to that extent partici-
pates divinity. In fact, the body receives life and motion from 
51 the soul. Those beings nearest to the divine henads partici-~ 
pate directly and those more remote through various mediums. 
The more universal a thing is, the more direct its participation 
in the order of being above. This is but another way of ex-
pounding the doctrine of the Primal Cause reaching farthest into 
the effects. There are no limits of space and time set to the 
penetration of the powers of divinity. 
It is thrO,ugh the providence of these gods that all 
things finally work for good since evil is but an absence of 
good and that which may seem an evil taken in relation to a part 
or parts becomes a good in the pattern of the whole. The divine 
henads are present to all things that participate but all things 
are not present to them in the sense of capacity to participate, 
~ 
that is, all things are not present to them in the same manner. 
Divinity is present to each series of being, in a manner to each 
causal order, and proportionately to each particular stage. All 
of these divine henads are fini~e in ~~ber but one is infinite 
to the other in power. It is infinity of potency and each minor 
order is comprehensible to what is below it. 52 
Another important item in the·doctrine of participation 
is expressed in Proposition 77 on causality. 
flAIl that exists potentially is advru!ced to actuality 
by the agency of something which is actually what 
the other is potentially: the partially potential 
by that which is actual in the same partial resgect 
and the wholly potential by the wholly actual." 0 
It is impossible for the potential to advance itself to actuality 
because all potentiality is imperfect and actualization is a kind 
of perfection. The cause would, therefore, be less perfect than 
the effect. Thus the power of actualizing emanates from the 
cause which is actuality and actuality continues tnrough the 
series advancing the residue of potentiality in a given item of 
the series to actuality in the same series or in the series below I 
and so the perfection of actuality to any degree is derived from 
a former actuality above. 
Proclus uses the word potency in two different ways. 
One he calls perfect potency and this refers to active power or 
the creative power of the One and is in contrast to the passive 
potency, Matter. Proclus does not restrict tnis active potency 
to God alone but to all intellectuals. 54 
All that comes to be arises out of tne twofold potency. 
The agent must have the creative power or potency and th~, 9roduct 
must have the passive potency. Every agent has an active potency 
all do~~ the line of being tintil we reach'body. Body in itself 
is without quality and without potency. It cannot act by virtue 
of being body but only by virtue of a ;»Petency of action residing 
in it; that is, it acts by participation of potency. Incorporeal 
things participate passive affections along with the bodies to 
• which they are joined and feel the effect of the divisible nature 
of the bodies, although in their own being the incorporeals are 
without parts. This is almost the same as the doctrine of i~11a-
nence in which the whole is found in every part and the part in 
the whole, since in simple essences there is no separateness or 
divisibility. 
The above seems to be only a restatement of tne 
doctrine of the cause remaining in the effect. The link between 
,... 
the participated and the thing participating is expressed in the 
following words by Proclus. 
flAIl that is participated without loss of sepa-
rateness is present to the participant tnrough 
an inseparable potency which it implants. 
"For if it is itself something separate from the 
participant and not contained in it, something 
which subsists in itself, then they need a mean 
term to connect them, one which more nearly re-
sembles the participated principle than the par-
ticipant does, and yet act~ally resides in the 
latter. For if the former is separate, how can 
it be participated by that which contains neither 
it nor any emanation from it? Accordingly a potency 
or irradiation, proceeding from the participated 
to the participant, must link the two; and this 
medium of participation will be distinct from both. n55 
This link being, as Proc~us maintains, something dis-
tinct from both seems to be an attenuation of the participated 
.. , 
substance which is not, in itself, completely actualized althoug 
in the participated it is. It is a logical connection with a 
sort of substantial uridergirding. Proclus does not say exactly 
what is is, but calls it a kind of mean-term. Here, again, the 
.language difficulty enters. The very use of the word attenuation 
in this thesis has a smack of material content to it and yet in 
• this discussion of logical order quantitative terms are more of 
a hindrance than help even though they are thought of in a sort 
of figurative sense. 
The above mentioned proposition was primarily directed 
-to the elucidation of the problem of the relation of the soul to 
the body, which was raised in Proposition 80, and that is the 
hardest problem of the whole doctrine of participation. 
How Matter emerges from the spiritual even in a creativ 
.... 
act on the part of the One is very difficult to settle. Proclus 
interpolates a sort of tertium Quid56 which serves as a con-
necting link. He probably gets the idea of this tertium qUid 
between body and soul from the fact that man proceeds in per-
ception back to a fantasm and from the fantasm to the idea in the 
soul. The fantasm has a mental element and is a kind of attenua-
. . 
tion, to say the least, of the object itself, but containing a 
mental element, as well as the material, it does form somewhat 
of a link between the material objective universe and the simple 
essences or spiritual entity called the soul. In Proposition 24 
the general scheme of the unparticipated, the participated and 
the participating is concisely stated as follows: 
"All that participates is inferior to the partici-
pated and this latter to the unparticipated. .' 
"For the participant was incomplete before the 
participation, and by the participation has been 
made complete: it is therefore necessarily sub-
ordinate to the participated, inasmuch as it 
owes its completeness to the act of participa-
tion. As having formerly been iricomplete it is 
inferior to the principle which completes it. 
"Again, the participated, being the property of 
one particular and not of all, has a lower mode 
of substance assigned to it than ~at which 
belongs to all and not to one: for the latter 
is more nearly akin to the cause of all things, 
the former less nearly. 
"The unparticipated, then precedes the partici-
pated, and these the participants. For, to 
express it shortly, the first is a unity prior 
to the many; the participated is within the 
many, and is one yet not-one; whi~~ all that 
participates is not-one yet one." '1 
Dean Inge in commenting on Plotinus offers an illus-
<-8 
tration of how a soul participates in an idea.o He raises the 
question, "Can many souls participate the same idea without 
division of the idea? Is the idea divided amon~ the souls who 
participate in it?" Of course,this is impossible. But if not, 
then one must think in terms not of extension and quantity, but 
rise to the conception of the world of reality which is spiritual 
and has its own laws. 
He further comments that reality must be understood in 
t f ' 59 erms 0 va.Lues. The real attributes of reality are values, 
and values in turn are nothing unless they are values of reality. 
Truth, for example, is subjectively a complete understanding of 
the laws and conditions of actual existence. It is the true 
interpretation of the world of sense, as notable by the soul 
when illuminated by the spirit. In its objective aspect truth is 
.' 
an ordered harmony of cosmic life interpreted in terms of final 
law and nowhere contradicted by experience. Perfect law and 
order are not found in the world of ordinary experience. These 
are only found when the soul turns to.~e spiritual world. The 
imperfections are in our faulty apprehension. 
The difficulty, says Dean Inge, is that the judgments 
of values give us an essential graded wo:Id, while the judgments 
of existences are not so easily graded. Judgments of valuesdo 
serve as an understanding for the system of Proclus. His order 
of existences or beings is based on their intrinsic value and by 
diligently keeping to that realm less difficulty will be exper-
ienced. The relation·of Mind and Matter is more easily under-
stood when based on their relative values. Matter then becomes 
a means of revelation or expression, and body only a means; or 
in other words, a recipient of forms which belong to a higher 
order and Matter to tne lower. Each, therefore, is understood 
by its relative values. In this way the system of Proclus be-
comes highly intelligible. 
Proclus commenting on the Alcibiades says, 
"Goods that are indivisible are those which many may 
possess at once, and no one is worse off' in respect 
of them because another has them. Divisible goods 
are tho~e in which one man's gain is another man's 
loss." 6U 
This is another way of stating the doctrine of the Undiminished 
Qiver and that the gradation of being is according to value. 
The thing that can be participated by many and yet remain 
undiminished is of higher value than that which participates it. 
In his attempt to elucidate the doctrine of ca~~ality 
he reiterates the doctrine that the more universal the cause the 
wider its implications are in the effects, or the farther reach 
it maintains in the effects. In Proposition 56 he says, 
"All that is produced by seconda:e.y .... beings is in a 
still greater measure produced from those prior 
and more determinative principles f6~m which the 
secondary were themselves derived." . 
In commenting on this proposition Dodds~ays, 
nVV'hen the principle of transcendence is pressed 
too hard the world of experience tends to break 
loose from its ultimate causes. This and the 
following proposition are designed to obviate 
this danger by showing that the ultimate causes 
are actively present in the whole causal series. 
Every cause is responsible not only for the ex-
istence of its effects but also for the whole of 
the causative activity of those effects---a view 
which seems logically to issue in a rigid de-
terministic monism, and is difficult to reconcile 
with the doctrine of (prop. 40). 
For an iLLustration cr. in Tim. III. 222. 7 f f. 
This theorem was found very useful by some of the 
later scholastics as a means of reconciling the 
emanationism taught by Avicenna with the orthodox 
'creationist' view: it is cited for this .purpose 
by Dietrich of Freiberg, de intellectu et 
intelligibili, II. i, 134 Krebs. 'quidquid fiat 
ab inferiori et secunda causa, illud idem fit a 
prima causa, sed eminentiori modo, scilicet per 
modum creationig~'; 1 cf. also Albert. Magn. X. 
413 a Bocquet." 
So long as the discussion is confined to indivisible 
~ss~nces and the causal chain, or in other words to metaphYSical 
aspects of the universe, the gradation of values is rather easily 
understood. But again the big problem looms up - where, in this 
system, is the inanimate matter going to be placed? On the 
pri~ciple of the First Cause having the farthest reach, matter is 
explained to be a direct creation of the One. It is not capable 
of participation in the Intelligible. There would be more Matte 
.,' 
without form than there are souls or intelligibles below the One. 
In Proposition 62,63 this doctrine is explained by stating that 
every manifold that is nearer to the One has fewer members than 
those more remote, but is greater in ~QWer. It is quite ap-
parent that bodily natures are more numerous than souls, that 
souls are more numerous than intelligences and that intelligencffi 
., 
are more numerous than the divine henads. Since simple Matter 
has no form it is at the one end as the product of the causal 
One, and the simple One as First Cause stands at the other end 
of the causal chain. Whittaker says on this point: 
part 
·This 
that 
"Proclus goes on to a characteristic doctrine of 
his own, according to which the higher cause -
which is also the more general - continues its 
activity beyond tnat of the causes that follow 
it. Thus the causal efficacy of the One extends 
as far as to Matter, in the production of which 
the intermediate causes, fe2m intelligible being 
downwards, have no share." 
The inanimate in so far as it participates in form has 
in intellect and also in the creative action of intellect. 
is seen in Proposition 57. 65 The Good is tne cause of all 
intellect is the cause of but not conversely. Privations 
of form are from the Good since all is thence. But intellect, 
being form, is not the ground of privation. Matter in itself 
has no form, and suffering privation of form it must be from 
the Good. Matter cannot act and therefore cannot in any way be 
a principle of evil. It is unable to struggle against the Good. 
This is an important question because here Proclus departs from 
Plotinus. Inge says on this pOint, where he quotes from Proclus' 
Commentary in the Alcibiades, 
"Proclus-is more emphatic in rejecting the dual-
istic interpretation of the nature of Matter. 
Matter, he says, cannot strug~le against the Good, 
since it cannot act in anyway. It is not dis-
ordered movement; for movement implies force, and 
Matter has none. It is not the evil principle, 
since it is an essential part o~\he composition 
of the world, and is derived from the One. It is 
not 'necessity' though it is necessary. ~fuat then 
is it? Take away order from everything that is 
orderly, and what remains is Matter. It is that 
which, if it had any active power,~which it has 
not, would produce disintegration J.n that which 
is integrated, disconnection in that which is 
connected. It is in a word that which is no 
thing, thougu.6not absolutely nothing; it is a 
'true lie,."b 
With God necessity and will always cOrreSl)ond. Matter 
was created in order that the will and activities of the soul 
and spirit might become actualities. With Plotinus Matter seems 
to have been an eternal creation. With Proclus it is very hard 
to tell. He maintains that it is not absolutely nothing and yet 
oes not tell us exactly what it is. 
In the discussion of Matter in Neo-Platonism the 
roblem of evil necessarily arises. Evils are the result, ac-
cording to Proclus, of conflict in the world of birth. The 
world is of such structure that it involves destruction, decay 
and death. But all this was necessary for the perfection o~ the 
hole. Infinite possibility was also a necessary condition for 
such perfection and therefore the existence of Matter. Matter 
of itself could not be evil because the philosophy of Proclus 
ill not allow for two principles of exactly the same dignity 
and im ortance. Matter cannot be the cause of the fall of souls 
because it does not explain the various inclinations of differ-
ent souls. There is no principle of evil. Evil is alway~ i-
.. 
67 dentical to the pursuit of good. The cause of descent to re-
birth pre-exists in the soul itself as a certain experience of 
alternation between the life of tne inteLLect and the life of 
it "t" I t 68 s own lrra lona par. There is ~ao latent in every soul 
the desire to impart what good it possesses to lower orders and 
hence the reason for birth and re-birth. Matter can only be 
• considered an evil in the sense that it is the ultimate stage 
of descent. In this sense it is only a lesser good. Such a 
world as ours should of necessity exist for the perfection of 
the whole, hence Proclus is an avowed Teleologist. Even latent 
dispositions to wrong need to be externalized in order that they 
might be punished and thus corrected. This makes even Matter 
serve a good purpose. Again by descending to a lower realm than 
·the intellectual it runs the risk of loss and therefore to unite 
with the material body is in that measure an evil. Yet in view 
of the whole it is a good and is providential because some souls 
descend in order to raise others. Proclus' doctrine of Fate and 
Providence makes apparent evil in this world to be only the re-
sult of our faulty apprehensions. In his De Providentia et Fato 
he says, 
"Many things escape Fate but nothing escapes Providence.,,69 
¥mittaker commenting on this line says, 
"Fate is the destiny undergone by particular beings 
without insight into its true causes. With com-
plete knowledge of reality, ~8te itself would be 
seen as part of Providence." 
All the parts according to this scheme are descended 
to tbe good of the whole and a certain amount of freedom .is .. 
allowed to individual souls and for this reason some souls go 
lower than others. But it would be inconsistent with the order 
of the universe that any being, among men or demons, should be 
always evil. 71 
The ultimate redemption of all is guaranteed in his 
philosophy of Progression and Reversion. Ueberweg helps on this 
.. 
matter of freedom. He says, 
"The psychical emanates from the intellectual. 
Every soul is by nature eternal and only in its 
activity related to ti~e. The soul of the world 
is composed of divisible, indivisible, and inter-
mediate substances, its parts being arranged in 
harmonious proportions. There exist divine, 
demoniacal and human souls. Occupying a midale 
place between the sensuous and the divine, the 
soul possesses freedom of will. Its evils are 
all chargeable upon itself. It is in the power 
of the soul to turn back toward the divine. 
Whatever it knows it knows by means of the re-
lated and corresponding elements of itself; it 
knows the One through the supra-rational unity 
present in itself. n72 
Proclus grants a certain choice to each particular 
soul, though he holds that each soul must by inherent destiny 
descend at least once to birth in a body. After this one birth 
all others depend on the choice of the soul. This implies a 
certain freedom but in the end all cnoice final~y comes int9 
subjection to Fate. 
There is another complete innovation of Proclus' into 
Neo-Platonic thought; namely, that of the astral body, or the 
doctrine of the Vehicle. In his discussion of souls in The 
RJ pmAl1.ts oJ: Theoloilv Proclus says that every soul takes its 
proper origin from an intelligence which is the next higher 
order of being and from tnis inteliigence it has all the forms 
.' -
which intelligence possesses primitively. At least it has tnem 
·potentially.73 
In Proposition 195 he places soul in a sort of inter-
mediate position between bodies and i~i611igences, or between 
the intelligible world and the sense world. In this proposition 
he says, 
• "Every soul is all things, the thine;s of sense 
after the manner of an exemplar and tne in"Gelli-
gible things after the manner of an image.,,74 . 
From this he moves on to the statement tllat eVEry participated 
soul makes use of a body which is perpetual- and has a constitu-
tion witnout temporal origin and exempt from deCay.75 He will 
not state plainly that the material body is perpetual, but 
.claims that the very being of soul is to en-soul a body. And 
since this is the nature of, its be~ng it must en-soul a body at 
all times and ,therefore there must be a vehicl~ or at~enuated 
body which it en-souls in its birth and re-birth. This astral 
body is eternal in its essence but temporal in respect to the 
measurement of its activities. The vehicle of every particular 
soul descends by the aad.ition?f vestures increasingly material 
and in reversion it ascends, in company with the soul, throlfgh 
the divestment of all that is material and recovers its pro~er 
form after the same analogy of the soul which makes use of it. 
Although he claims that this vehicle is immaterial and indis-
cerptible, yet he uses terms which are usually applied to ex-
tended bodies such as shape and size. greater and smal.1.er. etc •• 
in discussing it in Proposition 210. 76 In this proposition he 
goes so far as to say that its appearancesat different times 
.' 
are diverse. He makes this concession in order to make the 
astral body or vehicle conform to tne vcirious bodies which the 
individual soul might en-soul through its births and re-births. 
It would seem that Proclus resorts to t~~in order to sub-
stantiate or to carry out his scheme of triads throughout his 
entire system. As has been said before, his entire metaphysical 
.. 
scheme is based on the nature of knowledge and in t~e analysis 
of man there is found at the lower end a quasi material element 
in perception with a very small amount of purely intellectual, 
and at the other end a purely intellectual intuition of reality 
Nith reason as the mean term. But as all these beings are in-
separabl~ as a triad, so must he find in the union of soul with 
Jody some mean term (the astral body which is tainted with the 
naterial and yet attenuated to reach the immaterial and thus 
~onnect body and soul),' in·order to keep his triadic unities in 
Gact. 
As a final and more definite investigation of his 
)articipation doctrine, let us look into those propositions 
vhere the doctrine of participation is most prominent and most 
!learly expounded. 
In Proposition 30 he says t.ilat all tnat is immediately 
)roduced by any principle must remain in the producing cause 
md proceed from it.77 In developing this statement .Proclus 
lays that all procession, and procession is in a manner equal to 
)roduction is accomplished through likeness. 78 Each order of 
in discussing it in Proposition 210. 76 In this proposition he 
goes so far as to say that its appearancesat different times 
.' 
are diverse. He makes this concession in order to make the 
astral body or vehicle conform to tne various bodies which the 
individual soul might en-soul through its births and re-births. 
It would seem that Proclus resorts to~t~is in order to sub-
stantiate or to carry out his scheme of triads throughout his 
entire system. As has been said before, his entire metaphysical 
• scheme is based on the nature of knowledge and in the analysis 
of man there is found at the lower end a quasi material element 
in perception with a very small amount of purely intel~ectual, 
and at the other end a purely intellectual intuition of reality 
with reason as the mean term. But as all these beings are in-
separabl~ as a triad, so must he find in the union of soul with 
body some mean term (the astral body which is tainted with the 
material and yet attenuated to reach the immaterial and thus 
connect body and 'soul),' in·order to keep his triadic unities in~ 
tact. 
As a final and more definite investigation of his 
participation doctrine, let us look into those propositions 
where the doctrine of participation is most prominent and most 
clearly expounded. 
In Proposition 30 he says tHat all tnat is immediately 
produced by any principle must remain in the producing cause 
and l)roceed from it.77 In developing this statement .Proclus 
says that all procession, and procession is in a manner equal to 
roduction is accomplished through likeness. 78 Each order of 
being produces its likeness first before unlikeness and in some 
sense the product remains in the producer, be-cause if th~, term 
proceeded completely from the producer there would be no identi-
ty with that which remained. The common link of union with the 
cause is that it remains in the cause and proceeds in the effect. 
For if it remained altogether and only'..in the cause then there 
would be no production. It is both like and in some respect 
different from the cause. 
Dodds gives a good example. 
These two relations are inseparable. 
,. 
"If a, b, c, are three terms in sequence, b both 
proceeds from a and remains in it while c pro-
ceeds from a and b but remains only in b: thus 
soul both remains in Intelligence and is pro-
duced from it, while Na~ure has wholly detached ~9 
itself from Intelligence. (See In Tim. I. 12,19)" 
" Accordingly we have the triadic arcangement (a) fA- 0 V t'\ 
(b)}-- bY ~ K~\ -rrp ~ cS 05 (c)7Ipo' Ob'!» • 80 . 
Another element wnich Proclus introduces is what he 
calls continuity. There is no void in the physical uniVerse so~ 
there is none in the spiritual. 8l We must always kee.,tJ in mind 
'that spiritual beings are not separated by spatial but by 
qualitative intervals. This spiritual continuity which Proclus 
introduces in his philosophy of emanation and participation means 
tha~ the qualitative interval between any term of the procession 
and its immediate consequent is the minimum dif:(erence compatible 
with distinctness; there are no gaps in the divine devol~tion,.8k 
Whittaker says, 
. 8D 
"That Leibniz owes his idea of continuum to Platonism." 
Again in Proposition 130 Proclus says, 
"In any divine order the highest terms more com-
pletely transcend those immediately subordinate 
to them than do these latter the subsequent terms; 
and the second order of terms are more closely·' 
linked with their immediate su-oeriors tnan are 
their consequents with them. n84 
This is because the higher are nearer to unity or the One and 
enjoy more power or active potency. Each successive cause in 
10 ... 
the various orders of reality would, according to ttlis scheme, 
.be less able to remain distinct from its efiect. In procession 
:the order goes from better to worse, bu~ in reversion it is from 
worse to better and all that is lost in procession is restored 
:in reversion plus the retention of inai viduali ty which it got 
in procession. Therefore, even to en-soul Matter would be a good 
in so far as informing Matter would add to individual distinct-
ness. This continuity which Proclus introduces in his scheme of 
emanation is carreid out scrupulously in each order of reality. 
Beginning with the henads or gods, he has the same orderly scheme~ 
In Proposition 132 he states "All orders of gods are ,.. 
bound together by mean terms.,,85 Even gods experience pro-
cession through likeness. The gods possess the unbroken con-
tinuity, inasmuch as their substance is unitary. The One is 
their originative cause and they t~ke their definition from it. 86 
In these divine orders the remission of power is introduced with-
out loss of unity and the gods are more essentially unified'than 
mere existence. In their order the likeness of the derivat.ives 
to the primary is greater than 1n the extentional orders. All 
I 
classes of gods are, therefore, bound together by proportiol1Clte 
terms and even the first principles do not pass from immaterial 
into the emanations wholly diverse from themselves. There are 
intermediate terms which have characters in common both with 
." 
their causes and imm"diate effects. They preserve an ordered 
sequence in this generation of deities. Each order of god is 
participated by a more or less genus of existence according to 
the nearness of the god to the One a.nQ '..;the Good which heads the 
hierarchy. Being is the first order below the gods and it par-
ticipates the gods. Being is beyong In~elligence and life and 
is the most universal cause and is ther:rore the highest partici-
pant. It partakes more of unity than does Intelligence or life. 
All these henads are intellectual and the unparticipatedIntelli-
gence enjoys participation in them in the sense of likeness. In-
telligence is true being and therefore, as has been said above, 
being is the next direct or we might say the first product of 
the henads. S7 
Next in order after true being is Intelligence and 
.as 
again the unparticipated terms subsist prior to the participated. 
Intelligence is a form 01"' being which exists in itself and is 
beyond participation. ' True being perfects Intelligence without 
loss of transcendence to itself. It gives to Intelligence the 
gift of being. Being an intelligible it imparts perfection to 
Intel~igence. 
On the question of souls the entire theory of Proclus 
is not acceptable in any metaphysics today because of the physics 
which were accepted in his time. He attributed souls to the 
planets and other heavenly bodies. He claimed there were intra-
mundane intelligences because the world-order is possessed of 
intelligences as well as of souls and that these intra-mundane 
souls and intelligences participated the super-mundane intelli-
.' gences. 
This question of gradation of intelligences is very 
89 
. intricate and obscure. EVen Dodds claims that a part of the 
. text has been corrupted to the extent;,. ~lat it fails to make 
sense, but for our purpose the following may be said. There 
. are at least three grades of intell.igences. Tne unpar-Gicipated 
and super-mundane which has itself for tts object of thought. 
It is something akin to Aristotles' self-contemplative god. The 
intra-mundane is the world-soul and world intelligib~e order 
which produces intelligences. The third is the world of souls 
which participates intelli6ences in the sense that they partici-
pate the forms in the world-order. The higher intelligences 
enjoy intuitive thought perpetually. The human consciousness 
does not enjoy intuitive thought except intermittently. The 
super-mundane souls seem to be a sort of make shift in the sche~E 
of Proclus to take the place of what Plotinus called the higher 
90 part of the human soul. 
When souls pass in birth and re-birth from one bC(iy to 
another Proclus claims that the vehicle or astral body partici-
pates the souls perpetually because these vehicles are also in-
91 
destructible. 
But the mortal bodies only participate souls inter-
mittently. Intermittence of participation is the only real evil 
for Proclus. The Neo-Platonists clashed with the Christian 
doctrine of deliberate creation in time by maintaining an 
,.. A 
emanative creation which is timeless and unwilled. For them the 
only creative power is contemplation or intuitive thought, which 
• 
according to Dodds, at a certain level of being translates itself 
automatically into spatio-temporal terms. Each soul tak~s its 
approximate origin from an intelligence. This intelligence 
gives to the soul which arises from i t.,' .. as a part of the soul f s 
being, rational notions of all that it contains. The Intelli-
gence contains these forms primitively but in the soul they are 
.. 
implanted by derivation, since the soul is the proCtuct of Intellil--
gence. This possession by derivation gives to the soul the ir-
radiations of the Intellectual forms. The soul has sort of a 
dual knowledge. It is in a manner all things. The things of 
sense after the manner of an examplar and the intelligible things 
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after the manner of an image. 
The hierarchy or' s(;uls is more or less the same as that 
of intelligences. There are divine souls that are sovereign over 
many souls and herein lies the providential direction wnere all~ 
the parts converge to the well being of the whole. 
There is another very important reference to partici-
pation in Propositions 66 to 7493 and especially in Proposition 
71 which Gives a little further light on this particular thought. 
It is as follows: 
"All those characters which in the o:"iginative 
causes have higher and more universal rank become 
in the resultant beings, through the irradiations 
which proceed from them, a kind of substratum for 
the glfts of the more specific principles; and 
while the irradiations of the superior principles 
thus serve as a basis, the characters which pro-
ceed from secondary principles are founded upon 
them: there is thus an order of precedence in 
"participation, and successive rays strike dOwn-
wards upon the same recipient, the more universal 
causes affecting it first, and the more specific .' 
supplementing these by the bestowal of their own 
gifts upon the participants. n84 
When this proposition is compared with the scheme of Dodds, "Thic} 
is based in Propositions 14 to 20,95 it is found that it is 
practically the same thing. There th~ tne was the cause of 
,everything from pure being to unformed matter and each successivE 
order of being became a successive undergirding to the other 
• • 
orders. It is a sort of succession of irradiations. The last 
)1 
'one the UA? is caused only by the One and its essence is com-
-prised of an element of unity alone. It is simple by virtue of 
lying at the other extreme of the order from the One and has no 
form whatever. Each successive order of being by the virtue of 
participation has some element of the one above it and in its 
reversion follows these successive elements or orders. There 
is both a like and an unlike in each intermediate order between 
,... 
the two extremes. The two extremes have one element of likeness. 
)J I 
This does not mean, however, that the U~1 and the One are 
/1 
identical. It simply means that all the essence that the U~1 
has is simplicity or unity but in the least possible quality or 
quantity. It is, of course, infinitely inferior to the One but 
has no other unity except a miminal unity. Each successive,step 
in participation forms a basis for the bestowal of subordinate 
gifts. 
Much has been said in the above pages on participation 
and yet one feels that he has not a strong grip upon the thought. 
There seems to be something elusive that can't be tacked down. 
Proclus . seems to leave us dissatisfied. The reason will.·be 
somewhat understood from the next chapter in 'Nhich an evaluation 
of his doctrine will be attempted. 
• 'I 
.e' 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
Any evaluation of the doctrines of Proclus must ac-
credit him with a definite attempt to interpret the universe 
on a spiritual basis. His philosophy was a real rebuke, if 
not a refutation of the Stoics and Epiqpreans whose doctrine 
developed after Plato and Aristotle. Although Proclus was 
headed in the right direction, he certainly was not warranted 
in gOing to the extreme which he did in his regress. He is 
more culpable than his illustrious predecessors; namely, 
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, because the Christian revela-
tion had been brought to his notice. I maintain ~his on the 
basis that he surely knew of Porphyry and it was he who wrote 
a diatribe against Christianity_ It is thought by some, and 
I share the opinion, that the systematic and studied silence 
of Proclus in regard to Christianity was a deliberate attempt 
to show his contempt for it. His thinned-out One, which at 
times is almost everything and at other times on the brink of 
nothing except unity, naked and bare, is in nowise philo-
sophically comparable to the Creator-God of the Christian 
revelation. The above mentioned predecessors of Proclus are 
to be excused because they lived without a knowledge of the 
~., __ C_h_r_i_s_t_i_an _ r_e_v_e_l_a_t_i_o_n ____ p_r_o_c_l_U_s_unm __ i_s_t_ak_a_b_l_y_h_a_d _ s_U_C_h_kn_O_W_l_e_d_g_e_ • ..,! l His God or the One is but a logical entity. It was 
unnecessary that he should go beyond Pure Being which is at the 
same time pure act in his regress. He makes unity to be the 
4( 
producing cause of being while even according to logic being 
should be first. Existence or being must necessarily be 
posited as a residence for unity which should only be an at-
tribute. Proclus thought that he mU$tnarrive at Pure Unity or 
the One in order to fulfill his psychological scheme. Yet, 
had he looked more closely into his microcosm he would have 
.. found that the hierarchical steps in epistomology are not sepa-
rated entities which indicate orders of being in the cosmos, 
but that all of these functions belong to one human being. 
Therefore, had he been true even to his own system, he would 
necessarily have come to the conclusion that the One or God 
should be a being of pure act to whom the exercise of intelli-
gence, power, and providence could be attributed. It is for 
this reason that I say that his One was only a logical entity. 
One of the weaknesses of his philosophy was' the fact that he ~ 
endeavored to saddle on to the cosmos a logical system which 
did not fit in all pOints. 
Now we must address ourselves to the question, does 
the act of participation originate in the lower or the higher· 
order of being? Although he attributes the activity of partici 
. 
pation to lower orders it is clear that this power to partici-
pate is received from the higher. He tenaciously maintains 
that there is nothing in the effect that is not in the cause. 
He holds the cause to be perfect and that anything that appears 
in the subsequent is an actualized potency which was made 
actual by virtue of its having previously been actualized in a 
higher order. Using his same air~tight logic we are forced to 
.' the conclusion that all lower orders of being have received 
their various powers, and even that of participation, from the 
higher. Therefore, the power of participation is vested 
finally in the higher order. Any d:L$t.;i.nctly new element which 
the consequent possesses is a gift from the higher. Even the 
appetite to revert back is as it were a constant stream that 
• flows out fromh~her to lower and circles back again. 
His doctrine of reversion in cycles seems to be 
superfluous •. Neither his psychological findings nor the ob-
servable facts in nature warrant such a conclusion. While it 
is true that the psychological urge in man never seems to be 
fully satisfied, that his capabilities for knowledge seem to 
be ever expanding, and that infinity might logically be de-
duced as his goal, yet'th.is does not justify the reversion 
doctrine to the extreme extent that Proclus held it. His 
was a mistaken teleology. The observable facts in nature 
only warrant the conclusion that there is an intrinsic design 
and purpose in the universe and that all things are working 
naturally toward their proper end. This proper end is that 
they reach their full productivity and enjoyment, and als~ 
perpetuate their species or kind. To argue that each order 
of being must revert back to a higher order, etc., etc., may 
be done in the realm of pure logiC but it does not fit in the 
realm of the observable universe. 
Proclus. on the other hand, made a valuable 
contribution to metaphysics and, of course, as has already 
been said, he blazed the trail more clearly than his prede-
.' cessors for the spiritual interpretation of the universe. His 
contribution to the immateriality of the soul and to the ex-
istence of the intelligible world is beyond estimate. That he 
influenced many of the middle age p~lPsophers and theologians 
is readily admitted by all. The extent of this influence is 
reserved for a later thesis on this same general subject but 
with much wider scope. 
,. 
His doctrines of simple essences, the undiminished 
giver, cause and effect, evil as an absence of good, design 
and providence in the universe, as well as his doctrine of 
emanence, are in the main acceptable by Christian philosophers. 
His doctrine of transcendence is sadly lacking when compared 
with the Christian Scholastic philosophy and theology. 
Finally, what is participation according to Proclus? 
It is the impartation by a higher order of being of something~ 
of its own likeness, without diminution to itself, to a lower 
order and at the same time a gift to this lower order of a new 
element. This new element in turn can be imparted to a still 
lower order. All that is imparted remains in a larger degree, 
or more perfectly, in the higher. The lower order, howev~r, by 
virtue of this impartation from the higher, is said to partici-
pate in the higher to the degree that it has received from it 
by impartation. 
In taking leave of Proclus I should like to say that 
his metaphYsical voice is like a prophet crying in the 
wilderness of present day hyper-specialization which deals only 
with parts. Proclus is calling us back and urging that"'we fit 
the parts into the whole. He was at least brave and consistent 
enough to attempt a philosophic system which would include all 
the facts which in his estimation were worthy of a place in the 
.... 
cosmic scheme. He did well, contributed much and at least laid 
a few stones in the foundation upon which it was st. Thomas' 
glory to build the temple of true philisophy. 
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